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LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION MARKETS:
THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON
MARKET TRENDS
Dawna L. Rhoades
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

ABSTRACT
Since the United States deregulated its airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, the international air transport industry has been on a path toward market
liberalization. Market changes have included entry, capacity, and pricing freedom as well as
increased levels of foreign ownership. The recent terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 have
the potential to alter, if not reverse this course. This paper examines the forces fueling the
trend toward liberalization and analyzes the impact of recent events on the future prospects
of open aviation markets.

INTRODUCTION
According to the World Investment Report 2001
published by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, global foreign direct
investment rose to a record US$1.3 trillion
dollars in 2000. Contributing to this increase
was the number of cross border mergers and
acquisitions, which were up nearly 50 percent to
US$1.1 trillion (UNCTAD, 2001). In addition to
the growth in FDI, world merchandise and
service exports have continued to post significant
gains.
World Trade Organization figures
indicate that merchandise exports rose to
US$5.47 trillion dollars in 1999 while service
exports rose to US$1.35 trillion for the same
period. Travel services accounted for $440

billion of these dollars (World Trade Organiza
tion, 2001). The latest estimates from the
International Air Transport Association are that
the total economic output of the air transport
industry is over US$1.3 trillion. In the United
States alone, the airline industry contributed
nearly $273 billion dollars to the total economy,
including $109.1 billion in direct expenditures
(salaries, purchase of equipment, etc), $109.1
billion in indirect benefits (airports revenue,
travel agency), and $54.6 billion in visitor
spending and conference revenues (Air Transport
Association, 2000).
While the international air transport industry
has played a significant role in globalization of
economic activity, the industry itself has
Fall 2002

45

remained firmly rooted in the domestic market.
Governments around the world have treated
airlines like a public utility whose service is said
to be in the public interest. The public interest
argument is based on three areas: national
security and use in national defense under
programs like the U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet
program, postal air delivery, and contribution to
commercial activity (Kane, 1999). International
airlines also “carry the flag” and represent the
national achievement and pride of their home
country. This latter role is not to be underesti
mated. When the bankruptcy and subsequent
grounding of the Swissair fleet forced the Swiss
football team to fly Aeroflot to a qualifying match
in Moscow, one article reported this as a “further
humiliation for the Swiss flag carrier” (Hall,
Grant, Done, Cameron, and Dombey, 2001).
Because of the special status accorded to air
transport, governments have always taken an
interest in promoting and protecting their
national carriers. Directly or indirectly govern
ments played an important role in shaping their
national aviation systems. A tightly regulated
international aviation market whose basic
precepts were laid out even before the end of
World War II insured protecting the national
industry and its carrier(s). In recent years that
regulatory regime has come under increasing
pressure to liberalize. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 have called this trend into
question as governments worldwide now struggle
with issues of security.
Many of these
governments are also faced with an aviation
system on the verge of collapse.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First, the
regulatory development of the air transportation
system will be reviewed, including the rationales
for treating air transport as a special case in
international business.
Second, the forces
leading to liberalization of this market will be
examined. Third, the progress in air liberali
zation will be discussed prior to the recent
terrorist attacks. Finally, the impact of these
attacks on the transportation industry and
liberalization will be assessed.
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REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
The development of a regulatory regime for the
international air transport industry can be
divided into four phases. Phase I witnessed the
birth of the industry and a philosophical struggle
between freedom and tight regulation. Phase II
began with the reluctant acceptance of a system
of relatively tight regulation. Phase III saw
deregulation of the U.S. air transport industry
and renewed efforts for a more liberal inter
national air transport regime. Phase IV may
mark its beginning on September 11, 2001 with
the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon.
Phase I, 1910-1943
Seven years after the first heavier-than-air,
manned flight of the Wright Brothers at Kitty
Hawk, the first international conference on air
navigation was convened in Paris in 1910. The
key debate was over the rights and privileges of
flying. One view sought to apply the “Freedom of
the Seas” model to the entire airspace and was
championed by the French and German
delegations. The other view argued for the
sovereignty of nations over the airspace above
their terrestrial borders with rights to control
entry and in airspace activities. The British
were the key proponents of the national
sovereignty faction. While the Paris Conference
did succeed in identifying the key concepts,
terms, and technical provisions of international
aviation, it failed to resolve the freedom/
sovereignty debate. In the absence of interna
tional agreement, the British moved to pass the
British Aerial Navigation Act in 1911 (amended
in 1913). This act declared British rights to its
sovereign airspace and gave the Home Secretary
full power to regulate the entry of foreign
aircraft.
The other European governments
followed the British example prior to the
beginning of World War I.
World War I clearly demonstrated the potential
of aviation in the military arena as an offensive
and defensive weapon. The ability of aircraft to

support the transportation of troops and
equipment would not be fully realized until
World War II, but the supporting role of aviation
was not ignored following World War I. An
aeronautical commission formed as part of the
Peace Conference ending World War I decided to
prohibit the development of military aviation in
Germany but to allow civil aviation to continue.
The Commission also drafted the Paris
Convention of 1919 whose first article
proclaimed the right of each state to “complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory.” The Paris Convention would
remain in effect until superceded by the Chicago
Convention (Sochor, 1991).
The period between the two world wars saw two
different models of government intervention in
the development of the domestic air trans
portation system. Direct intervention became
the most frequent method of promoting domestic
aviation. Governments either provided direct
subsidies and/or assumed full or partial
ownership of air transport companies. British
Airways and Air France are two classic examples
of this strategy. The British Overseas Airways
Corporation (BOAC) was created in 1939 when
two smaller British carriers were merged and
nationalized. Air France emerged in 1933 from
the merger and nationalization of Air Orient, Air
Union, CIDNA and SGTA (Hengi, 2000). This
direct intervention did not suit the philosophical
and political tastes of U.S. lawmakers and
officials.
Indirectly, the U.S. government
strongly influenced domestic air transportation
through the U.S. Post Office Department that
was authorized by the Air Mail Act of 1925, also
called the Kelly Act, to enter into contracts with
private persons or companies to transport mail
by air. The Air Mail Act was amended in 1930 to
give the postmaster the authority to consolidate
routes in the public interest. Postmaster Walter
F. Brown used his authority to redraw the air
map of the U.S. and award air mail contracts to
a small group of airlines that he considered well
run and financially stable. In fact, Brown had
told the carriers that the air mail routes would
be consolidated and awards granted only to
carriers with sufficient size to serve the route.

This “forced” major consolidation in the industry
in an effort to obtain these very lucrative
contracts, which could provide the stable income
that passenger service did not offer.
Many routes started offering passenger service
to provide “additional income” to their air mail
business (Davies, 1984). A scandal fueled by
smaller carriers who were excluded from these
contracts temporarily halted all airmail awards.
The Air Mail Act of 1934 changed the system of
awarding contract and barred all prior contract
holders from bidding on new awards. However,
the new post-master general, Farley, privately
advised these airlines to reorganize and reapply.
Thus, the airlines known as American Airlines,
Eastern Airlines, and United Airlines were
formed. In fact, almost all of the major U.S.
carriers except Southwest, America West, and
Alaska Airlines can trace their origin to early air
mail carriers. The increasing importance of air
mail added a further argument to the “public
interest” status of air transportation (Wells,
1994). By 1998, the ten major U.S. airlines were
responsible for carrying over 251,279 tons of mail
(Aviation Week, 2000).
Phase II, 1944-1978
While World War I hinted at the importance of
air transportation to the security of nations,
World War II with the Battle of Britain and mas
sive bombing campaigns clearly demonstrated
it’s potential. The technological advances made
during and just prior to the war also showed that
the industry could contribute economically as an
engine for innovation. Even as U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill were meeting in
Quebec to plan the cross-channel invasion, the
topic of a general meeting to discuss the future of
air transportation came up as an issue. The
conference was convened in Chicago on
November 1, 1944. Representatives of all but
one of the allied World War II nations attended
it. The delegates were presented with four
proposals for an international aviation system.
The joint proposal of Australia and New Zealand
called for international ownership and manage
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ment of all international air service. The United
States proposal sought a system with
unrestricted air service rights and market-based
control of frequency and fare issues. The British
wanted an international regulatory body to
distribute air routes and determine frequency
and fares. The Canadians offered a compromise
proposal that would have allowed limited
competition in a system controlled by a
multilateral oversight body. No agreement could
be reached on the main issues. Neither the U.S.
nor Great Britain was willing to compromise
their positions or jeopardize efforts to conclude
the war. Great Britain also had one final card to
play—landing rights.
They suggested the
possibility of developing an all-Commonwealth
airline with exclusive landing rights in
Commonwealth and British territories. Since
the parties had no reason to assume that the
British Empire would change following the war,
this appeared to be a credible threat (Sochor,
1991).

Without agreement on anything but the basic
freedoms at the conclusion of the Chicago
Convention, national governments were forced to
fall back on the traditional means of resolving
territorial disputes—treaty. In 1946, two key
wartime allies and aviation leaders, the United
States and the United Kingdom, met to negotiate
and sign the first bilateral air service agreement.
The Bermuda Agreement as it is now known
became the model for all future bilateral air
service agreements. The Agreement granted
each party the five freedoms of the air (Table 1
lists these five and the four additional freedoms
added later.) on named routes for multiple
carriers without specifying capacity or frequency
limitations. The U.S. also agreed in principle to
the establishment of an international body, the
International Air Transport Association (IATA),
to set fares. Subsequent bilaterals not including
the U.S. also included frequency and capacity
limitations that attempted to split air traffic
between designated carriers of the two countries

TABLE 1
THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
Freedom

Description

First

The right to fly over the territory of a contracting state without landing

Second

The right to land on the territory of the contracting state for non-commercial purposes

Third

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail for the state of registration to the aircraft to another state
and set them down there

Fourth

The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states in another contracting state
and to transport them to the state of registration of the aircraft

Fifth

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states as a continuation of, or as a
preliminary to, the operation of the third or fourth freedoms

Sixth

The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail in one state and to transport them to a third state
after a stopover in the aircraft’s state of registration and vice versa

Seventh

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states on a service that does not touch
the aircraft’s country of registration

Eighth

The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail within the territory of a state that is not the aircraft’s
country of registration (full cabotage)

Ninth

The right to interrupt a service
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involved. A pooling agreement was often
included to insure that revenue was evenly
divided between country carriers (Toh, 1998).
Bermuda I was a compromise that clearly
favored the U.S., as did most of the other
agreements signed shortly after the war. Unlike
the nations of Europe, the U.S. had both a
number of air carriers and an intact aviation
system. It also had money that many countries
sought to help them rebuild following the war.
As a result, the U.S. carriers were granted
greater capacity and frequency freedom as well
as more extensive beyond or fifth freedom rights.
By 1976, the British felt confident enough to give
notice of their decision to terminate Bermuda I.
The Bermuda II agreement, signed in 1977
eliminated multiple carrier designations, limited
capacity, and restricted American fifth freedom
rights. The U.S. viewed this as a major setback
in the liberalization of international air
transport (Toh, 1998).

Phase III, 1979-2000
To demonstrate it’s commitment to air transport
liberalization, the United States initiated three
actions in 1978. In early 1978, the U.S. issued a
statement entitled “Policy for the Conduct of
International Air Transportation.” This state
ment reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to
liberalization. Shortly afterwards, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued an order to
IATA to “show cause” why they should not be
considered an illegal cartel as prohibited by U.S.
anti-trust law. Since LATA membership was
restricted to international airlines whose major
tasks included setting fares and capacity, there
was little argument of violation. Finally, in late
1978, the United States became the first
government in the world to deregulate its air
transport industry with the passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act. This Act would phase
out the CAB with it’s market control over
entry/exit, pricing, and service levels and house
the remaining safety functions of the federal
government with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).

The International Air Transportation Competi
tion Act (IATCA) of 1979 laid out the competitive
goals of future U.S. policy as encouraging 1)
multiple carrier designation without operational
restrictions, 2) market-based determination of
air fares, and 3) elimination of unfair and
discriminatory competitive practices such as
excessive user fees, exclusive airport services,
and limited access to facilities. These features
are incorporated in the U.S. policy of open skies
(see Toh, 1998 for further discussion). The U.S.
pursued two paths toward fostering open skies.
The Director of the Bureau of Pricing and
Domestic Aviation at the CAB laid out the first
path. The so-called Encirclement Strategy called
for the U.S. to bring pressure on smaller market
countries to sign open skies agreement as a
means of diverting traffic from larger aviation
markets.
This strategy was based on the
assumption that open skies would lower fares
between those countries involved and cause
passengers to change their traveling patterns in
pursuit of lower fares. The pressure of falling
traffic would then encourage larger market
countries such as the United Kingdom and
Japan to accept the more liberalized open skies
agreement (Levine, 1979). The U.S. first sought
open skies with smaller market countries. These
countries generated very little third and fourth
freedom traffic (to and from the U.S.), but stood
to gain by getting greater access to U.S.
destinations. There could also be no question of
exchanging domestic opportunities since these
small nations had little domestic traffic to
exchange (Antoniou, 2001). There is evidence to
support the economic benefits of open skies. In
the case of the U.S.-Canadian agreement, results
in the year immediately following the
implementation of the agreement saw an
increase in traffic of over one million passengers
as well as growth in the number of cities served
(Office of International Aviation, 1996; Pustay,
1997).
The second path to open skies came through the
application of the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) policy on approving
airlines alliances. This policy based approval on
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either the coverage of the rights under existing
bilateral or proven benefits to the U.S. (Gellman
Research Associates, 1994). In addition, the U.S.
DOT has granted immunity from antitrust to
alliances between carriers from open skies
countries. Antitrust immunity allows competi
tors to coordinate on issues of pricing, capacity,
and scheduling. This has allowed those alliances
with immunity to achieve greater levels of
operational integration, thus cutting costs and
improving quality through coordination (Oum
and Park, 1997).
The “carrot and stick”
approach toward achieving open skies has
results in some 50 open skies agreements (Table
2).
Other countries were also pursuing a more
liberal approach to aviation. Unlike the U.S.
domestic deregulation, the Europeans opted for
a more gradual approach to aviation
deregulation. The first and second packages
(1987 and 1990 respectively) liberalized air
transport among members of the European
Community by creating additional route and
carriers designation as well as lifting capacity
limitations. The third package, which became
effective in 1993, phased in further liberalization
ending in April 1997 with the creation of a single
aviation market in the European Union (Morrell,
1998).
Under this single market, carriers
established in any of the EU countries are
granted all of the so-called freedoms of the air.
With this step, the Europeans have taken the
lead in air transport liberalization. In fact, the
position of the European Commission,
Directorate General for Transport on open skies
is that “[o]pen skies is an American term which,
as we see it, is synonymous with a free for all
system depending on the good behavior of air
carriers and only a partial opening of the
market” (Sorenson, 1998, p. 125). The current
European view is that ownership and domestic
markets should be opened. These concepts are
embodied in a proposal put forth by the
Association of European Airlines (AEA) called
the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
(TCAA). While the AEA suggests that TCAA
should include liberalization of airline ownership
and right of establishment as well as harmoni
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zation of competition and leasing policies, the
basic objective “must be to ensure that all
airlines of the parties to the TCAA will have
unrestricted commercial opportunities to conduct
the business of air transport anywhere within
the TCAA.” (Association of European Airlines,
2001). Acceptance of this agreement would
essentially create a single aviation market across
the North Atlantic.
Other areas associated with air transport have
also been undergoing liberalization including the
privatization of airports, air traffic control
systems, and airport related services such as
security and the removal of restrictive policies
that favored domestic over foreign carriers. The
privatization of airports began in 1987 when
Great Britain sold seven of its airports to the
British Airport Authority (BAA). Since this
time, airports in Australia, Germany, Italy,
Argentina and a dozen other countries have
shifted from public to private hands (Pope, 1996;
Utt, 1999). Air traffic control systems have been
or are being privatized in such countries as
Canada, Switzerland, South Africa, and
Germany in the belief that private firms would
not only be able to raise capital more quickly but
would have a greater incentive to modernize
ATC systems, decreasing delays and improving
safety (McCartney, 2001).
In short, the aviation industry in general
underwent a major reorientation during the
third phase of its existence. Liberalization
increasingly won out over efforts to maintain the
tightly restricted markets of the past. These
efforts have made air travel more affordable for
passengers and airfreight more viable for
international shippers. Liberalization has placed
a burden on those few remaining governmentowned and run international airlines. It has also
threatened the small, nation market airlines
such as the Belgian airline Sabena. In fact,
liberalization has been a particular burden on
small, developing nations that have neither the
resources to compete effectively with the larger
international carriers nor the markets to attract
foreign interest and investment (Abeyratne,
1998). Nevertheless, as economies grew the level

TABLE 2
OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS
Year

Date

Country

Year

Date

Country

2000

11/28
7/27
5/2
3/16
10/12
10/11
3/16
8/26
6/30
10/11
12/15
1/8
8/28
5/2

Benin
Burkino Faso
Gambia
Ghana
Malta
Morocco
Namibia
Nigeria
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Slovak Rep.
Tanzania
Turkey

1995

6/14
9/5
6/16
6/9
6/14
6/6
6/16
6/16
6/15

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Luxembourg
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland

1999

12/6
5/24
10/21
12/16
12/6
11/10
4/12-29
10/21
4/13

Argentina
Bahrain
Chile
Dominican Republic
Italy
Jordan
Pakistan
Qatar
Umted Arab Emirates

1992

10/14

The Netherlands

1998

6/9
7/14
6/10
7/15
6/9
3/18
2/27

Korea
Antilles (Netherlands)
Peru
Romania
South Korea
Taiwan
Uzbekistan

1997

9/18
6/20
5/8
5/8
5/8
5/8
6/21
6/18
5/8
5/8
4/8

Aruba
Brunei
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Malaysia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Panama
Singapore

1996

9/10
5/42

Czech Republic
Germany
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of air travel increased. Faster growing regions
such as Asia saw double-digit growth rates
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Phase IV: 2001 and Beyond
Even before September 11th, the U.S. airline
industry was on a path to lose US $2 billion
(Arndt, Byrnes, and Woellert, 2001). Part of the
blame can be attributed to the same two
historical forces that have plagued the industry
for decades, a softening economy and over
capacity. As one famous disgruntled investor,
Warren Buffet, has noted,
The airline business, from the time of
Wilber and Orville Wright through 1991,
made zero money net (Miller and
Barnhart, 2001).
In fact, the industry suffered its worst previous
loss between 1990-1993 when it posted losses in
excess of US$10 billion (Rosen, 1995). The
airline industry is an old-line, cyclical industry
with high fixed costs and a very unionized,
powerful labor force. The industry that
witnessed significant consolidation following de
regulation has become increasingly concentrated
with the top ten major carriers responsible for
the carriage of the bulk of U.S. scheduled traffic.
While the remainder of the 1990s saw improved
profitability, there were a number of troubling
trends including sharp declines in overall service
quality (rising customer complaints, delays),
disgruntled high yield business passengers, and
labor unrest at such airlines as United,
American, and Comair (Rhoades and
Waguespack, 2001). Even the US$15 billion
bailout of the Air Transportation Stabilization
Act is not likely to prevent a number of U.S.
carriers from filing for bankruptcy (Arndt et al,
2001). Meanwhile European carriers are already
protesting this government aid and requesting
assistance from their own governments (Flottau,
2001). Some of the hardest hit EU airlines are
already requesting assistance (Sparaco and Wall,
2001).
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If there were ever any questions of the economic
importance of the air transport industry before,
there are few who doubt it now. U.S. airlines
have already announced layoffs of approximately
100,000 employees and some estimates claim
that there will be an additional six jobs lost in
the U.S. economy for each airline loss. The
airline industry appears unlikely to turn a profit
until at least 2003. Initially, the hardest hit
area will be the travel and tourism industry,
which generates over US$578.8 billion a year
and supports one out of every 17 jobs. Aircraft
manufacturers such as Boeing will also be hard
hit and are preparing for layoffs. Other aviation
system manufacturers such as Rockwell Collins,
Textron, Honeywell, and Goodrich are likely to
follow suit raising manufacturing layoffs up to
100,000 (Arndt and Woellert, 2001; Isidore, 2001;
Mecham, 2001).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Given the impact of recent events, the trend
toward further liberalization in international
transport is likely to stall and may well reverse
itself as nations struggle to stabilize their
aviation industries. The U.S. bailout smacks of
the kind of government subsidy that the U.S. has
historically derided other governments for
providing and includes provisions that would see
the U.S. government taking a non-voting stake
in airline ownership through either stock
options, warrants or other equity devices (Bond,
2001; Toh, 1998).
Government authorities,
particularly in the U.S., may well rethink their
position on industry consolidation in the face of
widespread industry bankruptcy.
If the
bankrupt carriers are allowed to continue
operation as Continental and America West did
during previous bankruptcies, the industry
would likely face the same devastating price
wars that have plagued it in the past as cashstrapped carriers drive prices down and keep
capacity up (Wolf, 1995). The inability of air
transportation to generate long-term profitability
has driven stock prices down over 41 percent and
downgraded some carrier’s credit rating to junk
bond status (Isidore, 2001). Insurance premiums

have risen by a factor of 15 for war risk and
eight-fold for passenger liability (Sparaco, 2001).
Increased security costs will either be passed
onto consumers or borne by the U.S. government
if security is federalized (Arndt and Woellert,
2001; Ott, 2001).
It is clear that liberalization will be at least
temporarily stalled as governments struggle
with the immediate security and economic issues
raised by the terrorist attacks. The length of
the stall is partly contingent on the global efforts
to “root out terrorism.” The long-term fate of
international aviation is a matter of conjecture,
but the following three scenarios seem most
likely.
Scenario One
The trend toward liberalization reverses itself as
nations revert to a very protectionist approach to
aviation. The longer the war on terror, the more
likely international aviation is to slip back into
the old protectionist pattern. If the events of
September 11th threaten to devastate national
airlines and economies, governments are even
more likely to take actions to protect jobs and
markets. Even before 9/11, there were forces at
work that sought to pull back from liberalization.
Examples of this trend include the European
debate over the fate of Sabena and Swissair.
The Belgian and Swiss governments are intent
on “saving” their national airlines for reasons
that opponents believe violate the concepts of
free, open markets. The Canadian decision to
allow Air Canada to merge with Canadian
Airlines was also seen as a resurgence of
aviation nationalism. Most recently, Europeans
have complained that the U.S. package of loan
guarantees to post-9/11 carriers exceeded the
level warranted by shutdown losses and should
constitute illegal subsidies.
Scenario Two
Consolidation accelerates to the point that
national governments feel forced to consider
allowing at least limited foreign involvement in
domestic markets as a means of generating

competition.
This has already occurred in
Canada where government officials have not only
indicated that they might consider allowing
foreign carriers into the domestic market but
have floated a proposal for a North American
single aviation area. Under this scenario, a
TCAA might also come about for several reasons.
First, the security levels of most EU carriers are
at least equal if not higher than current U.S.
levels. Secondly, allowing EU allies in the war
on terror into the U.S. market would be more
palatable than throwing the market open to all
foreign nationals. Finally, it might be seen as a
reasonable concession to allies who have pushed
for such an opening. In an effort to aid their
airlines, the EU members might push even
harder. They could be aided in their efforts by a
decision due out in early 2002 from the European
Court of Justice on whether the EC has the right
to negotiate aviation agreements with countries
outside the EU. If the EC were to declare the
EU a single aviation unit, then the extensive
“beyond rights” of US carriers would be
considered cabotage and voided (Bond, 2001).
A number of issues would have to be resolved
before this scenario could come about including
changes in ownership rules, right of establish
ment, and harmonization of a number of the
laws and policies affecting aviation including
anti-trust policies, operation of aircraft, leasing,
etc (European Cockpit Association, 2000). There
could be a disconnect between the domestic and
international markets. In an effort to reduce
costs, many major carriers have announced plans
to withdraw from less profitable domestic routes,
many of whom will see regional carrier entry
(Ott, 2001). In addition, the growth of general
and business aviation could continue as aviation
fears, disgruntled business passengers, and
flexjet leasing programs make it an attractive
option to commercial travel. Major carriers
would then focus more on international aviation.
In effect, there would be a system of smaller,
regional carriers linking to major, international
hubs. With a further relaxation of ownership
rules, it is possible that the Australian/New
Zealand proposal at the Chicago Convention for
internationally owned and managed carriers
Fall 2002
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would finally become a reality. The current
mega-alliance (Star, Oneworld, SkyTeam)
structure might form the nucleus of such
carriers.
Scenario Three
In a further twist, it is possible that the industry
would decouple even further into distinct
businesses such as fleet management,
transportation, and marketing (Sparaco, 2001).
This decoupling might allow the industry to get
around some of the ownership restrictions that
currently prevent international consolidation.
Arguments for this type of decoupling draw their
rationale from two distinct but related fields of
strategic thinking. The first area is concerned
with defining a firm’s core or distinctive
competency. This resource-based view of the
firm suggests that firms are collections of
tangible and intangible assets that when
combined develop competency in certain areas.
This competency is defined as a skill, knowledge
or ability that a firm possesses that allows it to
achieve a competitive advantage over its rivals
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).
Under this theory, airlines would determine
what activity they could perform better than
rivals, then focus on this activity and outsource
other activities to firms that have an advantage
in that area.
The second, related area concerns the value
chain. In essence, a firm is a collection of linked
activities that may produce value for customers
(Porter, 1985). In a decoupled system, higher
profits would accrue to firms performing higher
value-added activities. Industries can be said to
have value chains, sequences of activities that
lead to a final product or service.
In
manufacturing settings such as automobiles,
aircraft, etc., it appears that the integrator (firm
responsible for some parts manufacturing,
supply network management, and final product
assembly) earns the superior industry returns
(Galbraith, 1995). For the airline industry or
more broadly speaking the travel industry, the
question becomes who in the value chain is best
able to assume this role. To a limited extent, the
54
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travel agent once performed the role of
integrator, but this role has been undermined by
cuts in commission fees, internet access, and
other direct marketing efforts. Conceivably, a
firm or group of firms could assume this role,
adding value to customers by packaging multi
modal transportation with accommodations,
vacation packages, etc.
Theoretically, the idea of a “virtual airline” that
outsources aircraft, cockpit/cabin crew,
engineering and maintenance, ground handling,
accounting, and reservations is appealing
(International Civil Aviation Organization,
1997). This would allow the virtual airline to
escape two factors that tend to plague the
industry during economic downturns—over
capacity and high labor costs. The virtual airline
would possess the flexibility to reduce both labor
and fleet quickly. The practical details of the
virtual airline are more perplexing. On a small
scale, the concept appears workable, but
envisioning a virtual airline the size of American
Airlines is difficult. It is also difficult to envision
how a traditional airline like American could
make the shift to virtual. For example, a shift to
outsourced fleet and crew would likely have to be
gradual and would incur the opposition of
existing labor unions who might well be
prepared to take labor action to prevent the
shift.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The international aviation industry is clearly at
a crossroads. While the industry and the govern
ments who regulate it might be tempted to fall
back into the familiar highly regulated days of
the past, it is doubtful that we will see a
complete reversal if for no other reason than
customer dissatisfaction. Airline managers,
government officials, and the industries that
support aviation need to begin planning for this
“brave new world.” The key unknown in these
calculations is the timeframe. Change is not
something that individuals or firms tend to
embrace gladly, so it is likely that the industry
will seek to draw out the transition to something
like a TCAA on the argument that firms need

time to make the structural adjustments
necessary. A similar argument was made for
NAFTA phase-in. For the near term, scenario
two seems most likely to succeed in some form.
The rationale again stems from the fact that this
change is more of an extension of what went
before than the decoupling of the industry that
would represent a dramatic shift in mindset,
core competency, and basic industry givens.
A number of questions remain unresolved in the
decoupled scenario that makes it difficult to
determine its viability or establish any timeframe for implementation. First, it is unclear
how and/or why firms might choose a given
decoupled segment from a value and profitability
perspective. As stated earlier, the two areas that
have generally been cited as preventing the
industry from achieving long-term profitability
are overcapacity and labor problems. Individual
airlines in good times tend to add aircraft to
their fleet. Then, the inevitable bad times occur
and the overall industry is faced with
overcapacity. Individual carriers with new,
expensive fleets tend to attempt to lower prices
to fill seats cutting into margins and triggering
price wars. It is unclear how a decoupled fleet
management firm would derive long-term
profits. There are likely to be some “economies”
to exploit and it is possible to compensate for
regional downturns by shifting fleets, but a
global downturn like the post-9/11 environment
would seem to put such firms at high risk. The
issue becomes—What type of firm would seek to
fill this decoupled niche? Some firm must do so
to make the overall system work. In regard to
the second factor affecting long-term
profitability, there are examples of firms
outsourcing maintenance. There are clearly
“economies” to be gained by consolidating
maintenance. It also would be possible to
outsource flight attendants. However, the key
labor group has always been pilots. In bad
times, they have given up wage/working
conditions to aid firms, but these concessions
have been the target of immediate concern when
profits return. Any scenario that threatens this
group is a likely to stir rapid reaction. When the
idea of using flight crews from lower wage

alliance partners was floated, unions were quick
to form inter-alliance union groups to block these
efforts (Gill, 1998). Even the reservation/yield
management systems a la Sabre that have often
been viewed as a key source of advantage in the
industry have come under criticism for creating
complex pricing schemes that drive away
customers, particularly the high margin business
travelers that support the much larger low fare
passengers. This is not to say that it is not
possible to develop a business model for
decoupled segments that would be capable of
attracting investment, but it is an elusive
possibility.
Under Scenario Two, the international carriers
would restructure their routes and fleets toward
the international long haul market leaving the
domestic markets to short-haul, lower cost
carriers that would feed international hubs
either because of market forces or marketing
agreements with the international carriers. This
would be more of an adjustment of U.S. carriers
than those in Europe where the flag carriers
have primarily focused on international routes.
Competition between individual carriers in a
TCAA would focus on several key areas: cost and
fare structure, service quality, and route
structure/access. In a study of cost competitive
ness among international carriers, Oum and Yu
(1997) found that U.S. carriers are more cost
competitive than all but a small number of Asian
carriers that benefit from lower labor costs. This
allows U.S. carriers to offer lower fares and still
make a profit. On the other hand, U.S. carriers
are rarely rated highly in surveys of
international service quality (Zagat, 1992). It is
less clear how consumers in an open aviation
market would make the tradeoff between price
and service quality.
CONCLUSION
Air transportation is a critical link in the global
system. It has been an enabling factor in a
process of globalization that has witnessed the
fall of most tariff barriers, the establishment of
the World Trade Organization, and the
integration of many national economies into
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broader trading associations.
Yet, air
transportation itself has only reluctantly been
dragged along the path to liberalization. The
events of September 11th can either jumpstart a
new era of liberal air transportation or stall

recent efforts to achieve liberalization. The
United States can lead air transport liberaliza
tion as it has led other efforts to open markets
and economies but only by taking certain risks
with its own air transportation system.
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